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 IS SCIENCE INCONSISTENT? 
 
 
 
Preface 
 
Otávio Bueno and Peter Vickers 
 
 
There has always been interest in inconsistency in science, not least within science itself as 
scientists strive to devise a consistent picture of the universe. Some important early 
landmarks in this history are Copernicus’s criticism of the Ptolemaic picture of the heavens, 
Galileo’s claim that Aristotle’s theory of motion was inconsistent, and Berkeley’s claim that 
the early calculus was inconsistent. More recent landmarks include the classical theory of the 
electron, Bohr’s theory of the atom, and the on-going difficulty of reconciling Einstein’s 
general relativity and quantum theory. But over the past few decades philosophers have 
taken a particular and increasing interest in inconsistency in science. In 2002 this culminated 
in the first collection of articles specifically dedicated to the topic: Inconsistency in Science, 
edited by Joke Meheus, published by Kluwer, and featuring twelve articles on a range of 
topics in the philosophy of science and mathematics. 
Since then philosophical interest in inconsistency in science has gained still further 
momentum. In particular, there has been a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is 
an inconsistent theory (Frisch 2004, 2005, 2008; Belot 2007; Muller 2007; Vickers 2008). In 
addition one can point to important new developments in our understanding of how 
inconsistencies infiltrate scientific practice. Mark Wilson’s work Wandering Significance 
(2006) is an increasingly important reference point here. One can also point to developments 
in our understanding of inconsistent mathematics (e.g. Colyvan 2008a, 2009), paraconsistent 
logic (e.g. Meheus 2003; Brown and Priest 2004; da Costa et al. 2007), inconsistency in the 
metaphysics of science (e.g. Verelst 2008; Colyvan 2008b) and inconsistencies in language 
(Azzouni 2005, 2007). 
Several major questions remain in the philosophy of inconsistency in science, on which 
some not insignificant headway is made by the papers in the current volume. In particular 
the primary question of the collection is the title question: ‘Is Science Inconsistent?’ When 
one looks to case studies such as those noted above it may seem obvious that the answer to 
this question is simply ‘yes’. However, as the recent debate over the consistency of classical 
electrodynamics has shown, things are not so simple. Philosophers cannot simply comment 
on ‘science itself’, as it actually is in its ‘pure’ form; instead they represent and reconstruct 
that science. The inconsistency of a theory such as classical electrodynamics depends upon 
how this representation/reconstruction is performed. Since there is no unique way to 
reconstruct scientific theories, it turns out that there is no straightforward yes/no answer to 
the question ‘Is Science Inconsistent?’ 
Thus the proposed volume starts by addressing what we mean by ‘scientific theory’, and 
the different ways in which different elements of science can be represented and 
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reconstructed by philosophers of science. Peter Vickers’ contribution ‘Theory Flexibility and 
Inconsistency in Science’ suggests that theories are ‘flexible’ in a certain sense, so that a 
given theory might be consistent or inconsistent depending on how it is (re)constructed. 
Karin Verelst’s contribution ‘Newton vs. Leibniz: Intransparency vs. Inconsistency’ gives a 
discussion of a strategy by which scientists have reconstructed apparently inconsistent 
science as consistent. Juha Saatsi’s contribution ‘Inconsistency and Scientific Realism’ 
shows how apparently inconsistent theories can be represented in a way compatible with 
scientific realism. And finally Christopher Pincock’s contribution ‘How to Avoid 
Inconsistent Idealizations’, argues that even within idealized science inconsistencies can be 
eliminated if one alters one’s perspective on the role played by the mathematics. 
But despite these ways in which the existence of inconsistency in science can be and has 
been played down, there are apparently circumstances in which it should be emphasised and 
utilised. For example, Robert Batterman’s contribution ‘The Inconsistency of Physics (With 
a Capital “P”)’ shows how conflicts can arise when one applies mathematical representations 
for different scientific purposes. Jody Azzouni’s contribution ‘A New Characterization of 
Scientific Theories’ shows how it can be beneficial to represent scientific theories 
inconsistently for certain explanatory purposes. Kevin Davey’s contribution ‘Can Good 
Science be Logically Inconsistent?’, and Mathias Frisch’s contribution ‘Models and 
Scientific Representations or: Who is Afraid of Inconsistency?’ then back up this thesis, 
arguing for situations in which inconsistency can be scientifically useful. 
Another option for the reconstruction of science is to make use of an inconsistent set of 
assumptions but to manage the inconsistency with one or another non-classical logic. 
Although this isn’t something seen in actual science, as a reconstruction it may be extremely 
revealing. The third part of the volume explores such a possibility, starting with Otávio 
Bueno’s contribution ‘Inconsistent Scientific Theories: A Framework’ which sets the scene 
and assesses the strengths and limitations of an approach that draws on paraconsistency. 
Newton da Costa and Décio Krause’s contribution ‘Physics, Inconsistency, and Quasi-Truth’ 
then takes this further, applying a paraconsistent approach to the foundations of quantum 
theory. Richard Benham, Chris Mortensen, and Graham Priest’s contribution ‘Chunk and 
Permeate III: The Dirac Delta Function’ draws on recent developments to discuss another 
possible application of paraconsistency. Finally in this section, Jean Paul van Bendegem 
extends the debate about inconsistency-tolerant systems of logic to a discussion of possible 
inconsistency tolerant systems of mathematics in his contribution ‘Inconsistency in 
Mathematics and the Mathematics of Inconsistency’. 
In the final section of the volume a new question is asked: what role, if any, should we 
expect inconsistency to play as science advances? Some have suggested that inconsistency 
should be left behind as scientists achieve greater unification, but Bryson Brown questions 
this in his contribution ‘The Shape of Science’. Similarly Dunja Seselja and Christian 
Straßer’s contribution ‘Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit: A Coherentist 
Approach’ suggests that in certain circumstances consistency should be sacrificed in the 
interests of progress. Finally James McAllister’s contribution ‘Methodological Dilemmas 
and Emotion in Science’ discusses how inconsistency can infiltrate science at a different 
level entirely—that of scientific method. 
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